The Adversarial System at Risk by Gershman, Bennett L.
Pace University
DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law
Spring 1990
The Adversarial System at Risk
Bennett L. Gershman
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University, bgershman@law.pace.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Legal Ethics and
Professional Responsibility Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bennett L. Gershman, The Adversarial System at Risk, Crim. Just., Spring 1990, at 22, http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/
413/.
I BY Bennett 1. Gershman 
The Adversarial System at Risk 
The 1980s witnessed a significant 
alteration in the balance of power 
between the prosecutor and de- 
fense counsel. The balance now tilts 
strongly toward the prosecutor. The 
prosecutor's ability to  obtain evi- 
dence through police searches, 
seizures, undercover operations, 
and interrogations was broadened 
(United States v Leon, 468 US 897 
(1 984); New Yo& v Quarles, 467 US 
649 (1984); United States v Kelly, 
707 F2d 1460 (DC Cir 1983)), and 
the defendant's ability to obtain 
potentially exculpatory evidence 
was limited (Arizona v Youngblood, 
109 S Ct 333 (1 988); United States 
v Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 US 858 
(1982)), making it easier for the 
prosecution to obtain convictions. 
Broader application of appellate 
doctrines such as harmless error 
(Rose v Clark, 478 US 570 (1986); 
Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 US 673 
(1986)) and restrictions on post- 
conviction remedies such as ha- 
beas corpus (Murray v Carrier, 477 
US 478 (1986); Engle v Isaac, 456 
US 107 (1982)) made it easier to 
preserve those convictions. The 
balance was further skewed by the 
continued erosion of due process 
constraints on prosecutorial ex- 
cesses in areas such as grand jury 
practice (Bank of Nova Scotia v 
United States, 108 S Ct 2369 (1 988)), 
charging decisions (Wayre v United 
States, 470 US 598 (1985)), plea 
bargaining (Mabry v fohnson, 467 
US 504 (1984)), disclosure of evi- 
dence (Pennsylvania v Ritchie, 480 
US 39 (1987)), and trial conduct 
(Darden v Wainwright, 477 US 168 
(1 986)). 
However, the most ominous re- 
cent development affecting the 
balance of forces in the adversary 
system is  the unprecedented at- 
tack by prosecutors on criminal de- 
fense lawyers themselves. Grand 
jury subpoenas to attorneys, law 
office searches, disqualification 
motions, fee forfeiture proceed- 
ings, and, most recently, IRS at- 
tempts to  enforce currency- 
reporting regulations do not seem 
to be isolated occurrences or mere 
happenstance. Rather, perhaps in- 
spired by Shakespeare's injunction 
in Henry VI to "kill all the lawyers," 
some prosecutors appear to have 
concluded that the most effective 
way to prevail in the battle against 
crime is to cripple the defense law- 
yers, particularly those who repre- 
sent defendants in areas such as 
enterprise drug crimes, currency 
violations, and RlCO offenses. 
The increasing use of this heavy 
prosecutorial firepower against 
criminal defense attorneys poses a 
serious threat to the adversarial 
system. Defense attorneys them- 
selves will be placed on the defen- 
sive, thereby giv~ng prosecutors 
considerable leverage over the at- 
torney-client relationship. Many of 
the most talented and aggressive 
defense attorneys will be driven out 
of defense work, unwilling to deal 
with the pressures, harassment, and 
potential loss of income from these 
prosecutorial tactics. Finally, pros- 
ecutors will be empowered to re- 
fashion and to some extent even 
control the course of private crim- 
inal defense representation. Al- 
though it is hazardous to predict the 
outcome, these developments may 
actually foreshadow the demise of 
the system of private criminal de- 
fense work. (United States v Mon- 
santo, 109 S Ct 2657, 2675 (1989) 
(dissenting opinion).) 
IRS Form 8300 
Attorney subpoena litigation 
continues to be a bitter source of 
controversy, with attorneys risking 
jail rather than revealing informa- 
tion that is  detrimental to their 
clients. (Julie DelCour, Attorneys 
jailed for Keeping Silent, Natl L J, 
Dec 18, 1989, p. 3.) As of this writ- 
ing, however, an even more con- 
troversial investigative weapon 
against attorneys is  being tested. 
This is the attempt by the IRS, pur- 
suant to 26 U.S.C. 5 60501, Form 
8300, to force criminal defense at- 
torneys to disclose the identities of 
clients or third parties who pay cash 
fees in excess of $10,000. (United 
States v Fischetti, Pomerantz, and 
Russo et al., No M-18-304 (S D NY, 
Nov 16, 1989) (Order to Show 
Cause).) As with fee forfeitures and 
attorney subpoenas, the issue raises 
complex legal and ethical ques- 
tions relating to the attorney-client 
privilege, the confidentiality privi- 
lege, the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, and due process. 
Recently, the IRS mailed to sev- 
eral prominent criminal defense at- 
torneys a request in the form of a 
"check sheet" for information from 
those attorneys who, in filing Form 
8300 ("Report of Cash Payments 
Over $1 0,000 Received in a Trade 
or Business"), withheld informa- 
tion concerning either the identity 
of the individual from whom the 
cash was received, the individual or 
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organization for whom the trans- 
action was conducted, or a de- 
scription of the transaction or the 
method of payment. The IRS letter 
concluded: "Failing to voluntarily 
submit the requested information 
could result in summons enforce- 
ment action being initiated." As- 
suming, arguendo, that the attorney 
received cash payments from a 
client who does not consent to have 
his or her identity revealed, what 
are the attorney's legal and ethical 
options and obligations in the event 
that enforcement action is  initi- 
ated? 
26 U.S.C. 5 60501 provides: 
(a) Cash receipts of more than 
$1 0,000.-Any person- 
(1) who is  engaged in a trade 
or business, and 
(2) who, in the course of such 
trade or business, receives 
more than $10,000 in cash in 
1 transaction (or 2 or more 
related transactions), shall 
make a return described in 
subsection (b) with respect to 
such transaction (or related 
transactions) at such time as 
the Secretary may by regula- 
tion prescribe. 
(b) Form and manner of re- 
turns.-A return i s  de- 
scribed in this subsection if 
such return - 
(1) is in such form that the 
Secretary may prescribe, 
(2) contains- 
(A) the name, address, 
and TIN of the person 
from whom the cash was 
received; 
(B) the amount of cash 
received; 
(C) the date and nature 
of the transaction; and 
(D) such other informa- 
tion as the Secretary may 
prescribe. 
The regulations implementing § 
60501 require that reports be filed 
within 15 days of the completion of 
the transaction or series of trans- 
actions involving cash payments in 
the same case. (26 CFR 5 1.60501- 
1 .) These reports, designated Form 
8300 by the IRS, are to be mailed 
to a central location where the in- 
formation is  entered into a com- 
puter. 
Since November 1988, willful 
failure to file a Form 8300 is a fel- 
ony punishable by imprisonment 
for up to five years and a fine of up 
to $25,000 ($100,000 in the case of 
a corporation). (26 USC § 7203.) 
There is also a civil penalty for in- 
tentional failure to file: ten percent 
of the amount which should have 
been reported, or ten percent of the 
taxable income derived from the 
transaction. (26 USC 5 6721(b).) 
Ethical rules of confidentiality 
However, the requirement that 
an attorney disclose a client's iden- 
tity may clash with rules of profes- 
sional conduct that broadly prohibit 
disclosure of information acquired 
by the attorney during the profes- 
sional relationship. Clearly, respon- 
sible attorneys do not wish to 
violate either the federal currency- 
reporting regulations or the profes- 
sional discliplinary rules that pro- 
tect client confidences and secrets. 
Those ethical rules are embodied 
in Rule 1.6 of the ABA Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct and DR 4- 
101 of the ABA Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility. 
Rule 1.6 of the ABA Model Rules 
provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal in- 
formation relating to represen- 
tation of a client unless the client 
consents after consultation, ex- 
cept for disclosures that are im- 
pliedly authorized in order to 
carry out the representation, and 
except as authorized in para- 
graph (b). 
(b) A lawyer may reveal such in- 
formation to the extent the law- 
yer reasonably believes neces- 
sary: 
(1) to prevent the client from 
committing a criminal act that 
the lawyer believes is  likely 
to result in imminent death 
or substantial bodily harm; or 
(2) to establish a claim or de- 
fense on behalf of the lawyer 
in a controversy between the 
lawyer and the client, to es- 
tablish a defense to a crimi- 
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nal charge or civil claim 
against the lawyer based 
upon conduct in which the 
client was involved, or to re- 
spond to allegations in any 
proceeding concerning the 
lawyer's representation of the 
client. 
The so-called confidentiality 
privilege includes but is broader 
than the attorney-client privilege. 
The Comment to Rule 1.6 observes 
that "the confidentiality rule ap- 
plies not merely to matters com- 
municated in confidence by the 
client but also to all information re- 
lating to the representation, what- 
ever its source." 
DR 4-101 of the ABA Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility 
provides: 
(A) "Confidence" refers to in- 
formation protected by the at- 
torney-client privilege under ap- 
plicable law, and "secret" refers 
to other information gained in the 
professional relationship that the 
client has requested be held in- 
violate or the disclosure of which 
would be embarrassing or would 
be likely to be detrimental to the 
client. 
(6) Except when permitted un- 
der DR 4-101 (C), a lawyer shall 
not knowingly: 
(1) Reveal a confidence or 
secret of his client. 
(2) Use a confidence or se- 
cret of his client to the dis- 
advantage of the client. 
(3) Use a confidence or se- 
cret of his client for the ad- 
vantage of himself or of a 
third person, unless the client 
consents after full disclosure. 
(C) A lawyer may reveal: 
(1) Confidences or secrets 
with the consent of the client 
or clients affected, but only 
after a full disclosure to them. 
(2) Confidences or secrets 
when permitted under Dis- 
ciplinary Rules or required by 
law or court order. 
(3) The intention of his client 
to commit a crime and the 
information necessary to  
prevent the crime. 
(4) Confidences or secrets 
necessary to establish or col- 
lect his fee or to defend him- 
self or his employees or as- 
sociates against an accusation 
of wrongful conduct. 
Attorney-client privilege 
narrowly construed 
No court has yet decided wheth- 
er the duty to protect client confi- 
dences extends to the reporting re- 
quirements of 26 U.S.C. § 60501. 
Several state and local ethics com- 
mittees (e.g., Florida, Georgia, and 
Chicago) have concluded that the 
duty does extend to such reports. 
Other ethics committees have is- 
sued advisory opinions discussing 
the attorney's duty (e.g., New Mex- 
ico, Kentucky, Connecticut, Phila- 
delphia, and the District of Colum- 
bia). However, the ethical 
standards' confidentiality require- 
ments are broader than the confi- 
dentiality requirements of eviden- 
tiary privileges. The attorney-client 
privilege-an evidentiary privi- 
lege-has not fared well in the fed- 
eral courts as a basis for refusing to 
reveal a client's identity. This is  so 
with respect to both grand jury 
subpoena enforcement and IRS 
summons enforcement. 
Because it is an impingement on 
the search for truth, the attorney- 
client privilege is  narrowly con- 
strued. The privilege exists to pro- 
tect confidential communications 
between a lawyer and his or her 
client that relate to the legal inter- 
ests of the client and society. (J. 
Wigmore, 8 Evidence § 2291 
(McNaughton Rev Ed 1961).) The 
policy behind the privilege is  to 
promote freedom of consultation 
of legal advisors by clients. In order 
to dispel the fear of compelled dis- 
closures, the law prohibits disclo- 
sures of such confidential commu- 
nications except with the client's 
consent. (Upjohn Co. v United 
States, 449 US 383 (1981).) How- 
ever, the attorney-client privilege is  
limited to communications that are 
necessary to obtain informed legal 
advice. As a general rule, therefore, 
neither the identity of a client nor 
the fee arrangement comes within 
the scope of the privilege, since 
Criminal Justice 
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neither matter is  considered confi- 
dential or a communication for the 
purpose of obtaining legal advice. 
(in re Grand jury Proceedings Uones), 
51 7 F2d 666 (5th Cir 1975).) 
To be sure, some clients might 
feel inhibited about retaininga law- 
yer, or might be less candid in their 
disclosures, if they anticipated that 
their attorney might be compelled 
to reveal their identities or the fee 
arrangements. This concern, how- 
ever, seems unavailing. As one 
court recently observed: 
Some prospective clients, argu- 
ably, may decide not to retain 
counsel for legal services if they 
could be implicated by expendi- 
tures for those services. This is  
not, however, a sufficient justifi- 
cation to invoke the privilege. 
The privilege i s  not to immunize 
a client from liability stemming 
from expenditures for legal ser- 
vices. Its purpose is  only to en- 
courage persons who choose to 
be represented by counsel, de- 
spite the consequences of that 
choice, to confer candidly and 
openly with their attorney. (Tor- 
nay v United States, 840 F2d 
1424, 1429 (9th Cir 1 988).) 
The courts, however, have es- 
tablished three narrow exceptions 
to the general rule that client iden- 
tity and fee arrangements are not 
covered by the attorney-client 
privilege. The first exception lies 
when the disclosure of identity or 
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fee arrangements would supply the 
"last link" in an existing chain of in- 
criminating evidence likely to lead 
to the client's indictment (In re 
Grand jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 
680 F2d 1026 (5th Cir 1982) (en 
banc)); the second, when disclo- 
sure would implicate the client in 
the very matter for which legal ad- 
vice was sought in the first place 
(United States v Hodge and Zweig, 
548 F2d 1347 (9th Cir 1977)); and 
the third, when disclosure would be 
tantamount to disclosing an other- 
wise protected confidential com- 
munication (NLRB v Harvey, 349 
F2d 900 (4th Cir 1965)). The bur- 
den of establishing the existence of 
a privilege rests with the party as- 
serting the privilege. Thus, it would 
be appropriate for the attorney to 
request an in camera ex parte hear- 
ing to support his or her claim. 
(United States v Zolin, 109 S Ct 261 9 
(1 989).) 
Court enforcement of 
IRS efforts 
Given the broad investigative 
powers of both the grand jury and 
the IRS (see United States v Arthur 
Young & Co., 465 US 805 (1 984)) 
and the public outcry against drug 
trafficking, racketeering, and mon- 
ey laudering, it is  not surprising that 
the courts have been reluctant to 
sustain claims of privilege-or, for 
that matter, broader constitutional 
claims of right to counsel or due 
process. Indeed, IRS efforts pur- 
suant to 26 U.S.C. 5 7602 (the gen- 
eral summons enforcement section 
of the Internal Revenue Code) to 
force attorneys to reveal informa- 
tion regarding fees paid by clients 
have invariably been enforced by 
the courts, so long as the govern- 
ment has established the threshold 
requirements that: 1) the investi- 
gation is  being conducted for a le- 
gitimate purpose; 2) the information 
is relevant to the investigation; 3) 
the information i s  not already in the 
IRS's possession; and 4) administra- 
tive steps required by the IRS code 
have been followed. (United States 
v Powell, 379 US 48, 57-58 (1 964).) 
Nor have the courts required the 
IRS to establish guidelines for the 
issuance of summonses to attor- 
neys or to show that it followed jus- 
tice Department guidelines (U.S. 
Attorney Manual 5 9-2.161) al- 
ready established for issuing grand 
jury subpoenas to attorneys. (Hol- 
ihed v United States, 689 F Supp 865 
(ED Wis 1988).) 
The justice Department's Sub- 
poena Guidelines-not followed 
by the IRS-provide that a subpoe- 
na to an attorney for client infor- 
mation may not be issued unless 
the prosecutor can demonstrate 
that: (1) there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that a crime has 
been or i s  being committed and that 
the information sought is  reasona- 
bly needed for the successful com- 
pletion of the investigation; (2) the 
subpoena will not be used to ob- 
tain peripheral or speculative infor- 
mation; (3) all reasonable attempts 
to obtain the information from al- 
ternative sources proved to be un- 
successful; and (4) the reasonable 
need for the information out- 
weighs the potential adverse ef- 
fects upon the attorney-client 
relationship. 
What to advise your client 
What are the lawyer's obliga- 
tions when advising a client who 
wishes to pay a cash fee in excess 
of $10,000? Clearly, the lawyer must 
advise the client that the lawyer 
may have a duty to file a Form 8300 
disclosing the client's identity, the 
amount of cash received, and the 
date and nature of the transaction. 
The lawyer should also inform the 
client of the risks of investigation 
and prosecution flowing from dis- 
closure of the client's identity and 
fee information. The client should 
make the decision, after full con- 
sultation, about whether his or her 
identity should be disclosed. If the 
client decides that his or her iden- 
tity should not be disclosed, the 
lawyer may ethically decline the 
representation or, if a relationship 
already exists, may withdraw in 
view of the apparent conflict and 
threat of prosecution for both at- 
torney and client. On  the other 
hand, the attorney may ethically 
choose to continue to represent the 
client and to refuse to disclose the 
client's identity, although the law- 
yer is  statutorily obligated to file 
Form 8300. (See Georgia Advisory 
Opinion No 41; Hall, Professional 
Responsibility of the Criminal Law- 
yer § 11.7.) 
If the IRS threatens enforcement, 
the attorney may continue to assert 
confidentiality until a judicial en- 
forcement order requiring disclo- 
sure is  obtained. Under DR 4- 
101(C)(2) of the Model Code, a 
lawyer "may reveal . . . confi- 
dences or secrets . . . required by 
law or court order." The client 
should be advised that he or she 
may seek to retain separate coun- 
sel to intervene and challenge the 
I R S  enforcement action. (FRCP 
24(a)(2).) If faced with a court order 
to comply, the lawyer will have to 
decide whether to risk contempt in 
order to appeal the order. (Cobble- 
dick v United States, 309 US 323 
(1 940).) 
As noted above, an IRS enforce- 
ment "test case" against a New 
York law firm and two of its attor- 
neys i s  currently being litigated. A 
decision by the district court i s  ex- 
pected shortly. 
Bennett 1. Gershman is a professor 
of law at  Pace University School of 
Law in White Plains, New York, 
where he teaches criminal law and 
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ecutorial Misconduct. 
LIVINGSTON HALL JUVENILE JUSTICE 
AWARD NOMINATIONS SOUGHT 
The ABA Criminal Justice Section is  seeking nominations for the 
1990 Liv~ngston Hall Award. The ABA's annual Livingston Hall 
juvenile justice Award is bestowed upon a juvenile justice 
practitioner for his or her contributions, with the highest degree 
of protessionalism, to the juvenile justice system. 
Contact the ABA Criminal Justice Section at 202/331-2260 for 
information on selection criteria and nom~nating procedures. 
The deadline for nominations is May 1, 1990. 
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